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Abstract—We present a monitoring approach and the sup-
porting software architecture for passive DNS traffic. Monitoring
DNS traffic can reveal essential network and system level activity
profiles. Worm infected and botnet participating hosts can
be identified and malicious backdoor communications can be
detected. Any passive DNS monitoring solution needs to address
several challenges that range from architectural approaches for
dealing with large volumes of data up to specific Data Mining
approaches for this purpose. We describe a framework that
leverages state of the art distributed processing facilities with
clustering techniques in order to detect anomalies in both online
and offline DNS traffic. This framework entitled DNSSM is
implemented and operational on several networks. We validate
the framework against two large trace sets 1.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name Service (DNS) [1], [2] is one key
component for the correct operation of the Internet. The
most used functionality of DNS consists in binding a given
URL (www.example.com) into its associated IP address
(123.4.56.78). This step is called DNS resolution. An
example, how the DNS resolution process works, is illustrated
in Figure 1. Several threats specific to the DNS exist. These
range from malicious domains hosting phishing sites and
malware, covert channel communications over DNS to cache
poisoning and client side attacks. We look in this paper at
an approach for monitoring DNS traffic in order to mitigate
some of the previously mentioned threats. More specifically,
the main contributions presented in this paper are:
1) the design and implementation of a passive DNS mon-
itoring architecture that can be used to track malicious
domains,
2) the design of an automated clustering method that cap-
tures relevant groups of functional different domains,
3) some insights on content distribution networks from a
local viewpoint.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II starts with
a short introduction to security abuses in DNS. Next, section
III describes the design and the architecture of the DNSSM
framework. A detailed overview on the Data Mining specific
1this work was partially made as part of an internship at INRIA Nancy
Grand Est
Fig. 1: DNS Resolution
part is presented in section III-B. The experimental results are
provided in section IV. Related work is discussed in section
V and section VI follows up with conclusions and discussions
on future works.
II. MONITORING DNS TRAFFIC
The Domain Name Service is a hierarchical distributed
naming service in the Internet, where one or several servers
are responsible for a given name space, called zone. For
detailed information about DNS, the reader is referred to
the references [1], [2]. The paper focuses on two major
security abuses found in DNS. The first abuse consists in
tunneling IP traffic over DNS traffic. Freely available tools like
dnstunnel [3], implement this abuse and are widely used
for bypassing WIFI Access Points authorization mechanisms.
However, this tool can be much more nefarious, when it is
used as backdoor from within an enterprise network. A second
type of abuse, also called fast-flux (illustrated in Figure 2),
consists in associating one fully qualified domain name with
several IP addresses. This technique is used for example for
hosting phishing sites or command and control (C&C) centers
of botnets [4], [5]. Rapidly changing DNS records and short-
living TTL values in DNS replies ensure that, even if one of
the IP addresses is removed from the network, the remaining
ones guarantee the high resiliency of the infrastructure. The
underlying idea of fast-flux is very simple. A combination
of round-robin based registration and caching manipulation
avoids any IP based access controls (firewall) or IP address
oriented defensive measures. At a first glance, a simple fast-
flux detection method could consist in monitoring DNS replies
for large sets of different replies associated to one single
domain name. However, this method will not work when faced
with large server farms or content distribution networks (CDN)
like Akamai [6]. Typical CDNs achieve the same redundancy
as fast flux overlay networks, using similar techniques. The
only subtle difference consists in the lifetime of a given
domain name. Malicious domains have still short spanned life
times. Since simple fast-flux networks can be taken down
by removing the name server for the malicious domain, an
improved architecture called double-flux emerged. This kind
of architecture is illustrated in Figure 3 and avoids a single
point of vulnerability by enabling dynamic updates of the
name server entry list for a zone. Thus, multiple IP addresses,
controlled by an attacker, can take the responsibility for the
authoritative name server and thus, make the take-down of
such a botnet much harder.
Fig. 2: Single Flux Networks
III. GATHERING TECHNIQUE OF DNSSM
In this section, the architecture and the design of the passive
monitoring solution DNSSM are described. This architecture
has to comply with several major requirements. From an
operational point of view, it has to be able to retrieve both
online and offline DNS packet captures. Thus, it can be
used as an online monitoring tool, but can also be applied
as an offline incident handling tool. For instance, in case
Fig. 3: Double Flux Networks
of analyzing a compromised network, the tool should be
able to retrospectively analyze DNS traffic, detect and report
suspicious activities.
A. The Architecture
The core DNSSM architecture (illustrated in Figure 4) com-
prises three main components and is based on the architecture
proposed by Florian Weimer in [7]. The first component is a
passive DNS sensor that is a simple packet capturer filtering
DNS related traffic. This sensor should be placed between the
recursive DNS server and the upstream DNS servers and its
purpose is to listen for DNS replies, filter data and feed the
retrieved information into the centralized storage which is here
a relationnal databse system (MySQL). This sounds simple in
theory, but in practice this tends to be more complex. Many
DNS replies are not well structured and many reply messages
have been observed to be erroneous. For instance, we have
observed large quantities of A Record types that were returned
to 127.0.0.1. Therefore, a tedious case by case analysis
had to be performed. Another unexpected issue consists in
letter capitalization. A question that arises here is, if names of
domains should be normalized to small capitals or if there
may be large capitals too. This questions sounds obvious,
but we have observed that some big ‘actors’ in the Internet
(i.e. Google) play with variations within the same name, with
both, small caps and large caps. For instance for google.com,
respective PTR records can have both kinds of caps, some
examples are, GoOgle.com, gOOgle.com, gOoGle.com, etc.
The assumptions regarding this behavior are that Google
somehow uses this trick to limit the impact of cache poisoning
(in case of badly implemented DNS cache server), to infer the
origin of the answers (geolocalization of a datacenter e.g.)
or even to encode some data back from the original query
of the user. Data that is stored, can be analyzed by both, a
human operator using a Web based interface or automatically
be mined by a Data Mining application. In order to make the
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tool more flexible, we have designed both variants, where we
have applied the R-programming language [8] and the popular
Data Mining tool Weka [9].
B. Data Mining in DNS Space
For the Data Mining evaluation of our approach, we had
to define different analysis parameters in order to model
DNS information. Therefore, we define ten different relative
features. We filter and retain only the different domain names
that have been requested during an observation period and
for which at least one reply with the RCode NOERROR was
received. These features and their respective motivations can
be described as follows:
• The number of IPv4 addresses associated with the same
domain names: we search for A and CNAME records
from gathered Resource Records (RR) and count all IP
addresses associated to the domain name. This aims at
detecting flux networks or content distribution networks,
which have high counts.
• An entropy-based index of IP address scattering Sip1 :
the aim of this index is to show the scattering of IP
addresses associated to the same domain name through
different subnets on the internet. The aim is to locate
all IP addresses for a domain name and to rewrite them
in binary form. Then, for all 32-bit positions of the
IP address, we calculate the Shannon entropy [10] that
respects the two conditions : the bit is 0 or the bit is 1.
To recall, a Shannon entropy for a variable x is defined
as: H(X) = −∑x p(x)log2[p(x)] with p(x) being the
probability that X is in state x and Plog2P set to 0 if
p = 0. After this action, we sum the 32 entropy values to
obtain an index between 0 and 32, where 32 represents
the maximum scattering.
• Sip2 represents the second IP address scattering index:
The advantage of Sip2 is that it considers two things,
which are not used in the first index calculation (Sip1).
Here, the differences in the positions among IP addresses
are weighted, since it can intuitively be said that the first
byte in an IP address has a higher relevancy and by this
a higher weight than the rest of the IP address. Second,
it also considers/counts the amount of different IP ad-
dresses in a data set. Regarding the entropy, if we have
two addresses 0.0.0.0 and 255.255.255.255, the
index Sip1 will be at maximum value (i.e. 32), but if
we have 20 different IP addresses for example, the index
will be lower, even if we can observe that the scattering
becomes more important. Sip2 attributes different weights
to individual byte positions. For each of the 3 first
positions of IPv4 addresses, we count the number of
different bytes in the IP address pool we extracted for
a domain name and then transform the obtained value
into the base of 10.
Sip2(domain name) =
100× nbdifferentsbytes1 + 10× nbdifferentsbytes2+
nbdifferentsbytes3
• The mean TTL value for A domain records. Small TTL
values are usually a useful indicator for flux-networks.
• The total count of requests made over the observation
period for domain names. Variations in the distribution of
this variable might indicate that an anomaly (e.g. phishing
site) occurred.
• The day period during which we can observe requests
for a domain. If there is only one request observed, this
feature is set to 0. It has been observed that legitimate
domains have longer time spans, while malicious domains
exhibit daily/hourly lifetimes.
• The ratio for requests per time period. This is a combi-
nation of the two previous features, which provides the
number of requests on a per hour base. This statistical
feature captures the average usage pattern/frequency for
a domain. It’s a usefull parameter in order to detect for
example domains involved in botnet as they are regularly
requested over a time period.
• The sub-domain count for a given domain. This parame-
ter, when it has a high value, can disclose algorithmically
generated domain names for instance.
• The count of authoritative servers for a domain. For this
feature, high values are a clear indicator that there is a
double flux network.
• A binary indicator is set to 0, if a domain name is
not blacklisted, otherwise this parameter is set to 1.
This indicator is based on available data about regularly
updated domain blacklists that can be freely downloaded
from the Internet2. This parameter is only used for the
needs of the web interface but not for classification.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Data Sets
In this section, the experimental outcomes for two different
data sets collected in June 2011, are presented. We aimed at
comparing very different data sets, different in the sense of
geographical location, volume, duration and access networks.
2www.malwaredomainlist.com, www.malwaredomains.com,
zeustracker.abuse.ch
Country Luxembourg France
Duration 1 hour 1 hour
# DNS replies 10 M 70095
Size of Datat 270MB 22.8MB
TABLE I: Passive DNS capture statistics
The first data set is originated from the INRIA Nancy Research
Labs, which represents a medium sized campus network. The
second data set originates from a regional Internet Service
Provider located in Luxembourg. The quantitative differences
between the two data sets are regrouped in Table I.
Table II summarizes some different viewpoints from the two
datasets. We have looked at how a set of hosts and domains
vary in the two datasets. For the domains, we have selected
some poplar and well represented domains like: Akamai,
Facebook, Apple, and respectively Google. From this
table, we infer that both datasets capture a similar number of
different subdomains for three domains Facebook, Apple,
and Google, but a significant difference exists for the domain
Akamai. This is natural since Akamai is a major CDN that
hosts services which are much more represented in the larger
dataset. Some recent estimates [11] of the Akamai network
range it at about 50000 hosts world wide. Although a passive
DNS analysis will only reveal geographically closed Akamai
hosts, this data is relevant to estimate the local load balancing
and service availability of the Akamai CDN.
Measure data set 1 data set 2
# IP for mx.twitter.com 20 0
# IP for csi.l.google.com 74 404
# IP for star.facebook.com 8 39
# IP for x.apple.com.akadns.net 24 24
# subdomains for Akamai 1137 135
# subdomains Google 306 444
# subdomains for Facebook 174 66
# subdomains for Apple 134 156
TABLE II: Domain measures
B. Data Mining Approach
The Data Mining approach, is based on a clustering task.
For this, it has been referred to the open-source Machine
Learning tool Weka. This tool is known for its large library
of supervised and unsupervised Machine Learning algorithms
for real scenarios.
For the Data Mining experiments performed on the data sets,
groups of domain names that share common behaviors should
be identified. Therefore, the values obtained by the set of
different features have been applied to the k-means algorithm
[12]. The k-means algorithm is a classical clustering algorithm
that is commonly used in Data Mining. For the detailed k-
means algorithm we refer the reader to [12]. The aim of k-
means is to divide instances into k clusters. More formally this
means, given a set of instances (x1,..., xn), with each instance
being a d-dimensional vector, k-means tries to optimally divide
n instances into k clusters S={S1,...,Sk}, where k has to be
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set in advance and (k ≤ n) and the intra-cluster sum of squares
has to be minimized. This can be expressed as follows,
argmins
∑k
i=1
∑
x∈Si ||xj − µi||
2
where µi represents the mean for the instances in Si. For the
analysis, the value for k has been set to k = 8, as for this
amount of clusters, the best results were obtained.
C. Results
In the experiments, we have analyzed the relations between
the obtained clusters and the different features. Three clusters,
cluster 3, 6, 7, are associated to high values in the Sip1
values (Figure 6a) and very similar low values for the TTLs
(Figure 6c). The Sip1 values are two orders of magnitude
higher than values for the remaining clusters. When looking
at the cluster membership, we have observed that cluster 7 is
grouping domains that perform user tracking services, like for
instance doubleclick.net, tradedoubler.com, quantcast.com,....
Cluster 6 stands for very popular domains like google.com,
facebook.com, skype.com, etc. These domains are operated
over largely dispersed IP range spaces and thus exhibit a
high dispersion. Cluster 3 is particular. While clusters 6 and
7 have both dispersion metrics in the high ranges (Sip1, Sip2
in Figure 6a and 6b), cluster 3 groups domains characterized
by high values in the Sip1 and lower (compared to clusters 6
and 7) values in the Sip2 metric. A manual analysis of this
cluster showed that most of the domain names are related to
CDNs as for example Akamai or Cloudfront. Typical domain
names in this cluster have the following pattern, fbcdn-video-
a.akamaihd.net ou d19n4gh4cmsbnt.cloudfront.net. This result
is consistent with the operation of CDNs, where DNS replies
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Fig. 6: Evaluation for some features
are based on geographical locations of the requesting client.
In our case, we have observed high values in the number of
A records per domain name, but most of the returned values
were discriminated by the Sip2 metric.
Cluster 5 regroups domains with large numbers of requests
per time interval (Figure 6f). These domains are very popular
with very high ranks by the alexa.com ranking. Typical
domain names in this cluster are, apple.com, amazon.fr or
adobe.com.
Malicious domains (80) were also present in one dataset.
Domains in this list were clustered in cluster 7. Examples of
such domains are:
• 00007.ru, used for hosting malicious code
• 000.bbexe.cn, used for phishing site and rogue login
script
• 01.finni.in, used for malicious hosting
• 010608.myftp.biz, used to host infected pdf files that
exploit an Adobe Acrobat Reader vulnerability
We have looked at the statistical profile of DNS record
types. We follow a sliding window approach, in which basic
frequency counting is done for each window. Successive
windows can then be compared using a statistical test to
check for matching distribution. For instance, tunneling over
DNS was easily detected because the proportion of TXT
records increased significantly. This is due to the operation of
dnstunnel, where the payload is encapsulated in TXT records.
Table III shows a typical distribution from out ISP generated
dataset. Worm and botnet spam activity can be identified by the
checking the proportion of MX entries. Significant increase in
this statistics is a clear sign of some mass mailing campaign.
RR Tpype Proportion
% A 0.49
% NS 0.003
% AAAA 0.085
% MX 0.093
% CNAME 0
% SOA 0.0011
% PTR 0.2728
% TXT 0.0426
% SRV 0.0001
TABLE III: Distribution of record types
Looking into the specific data entries can reveal highly inter-
ested information. For instance, in our dataset, the SRV entries
were mainly associated to VoIP gateways. The proportion of
AAAA records can also give a hint on the adoption of IPv6.
D. User Interface
Figure 5 shows a general appearance of the User Interface
of DNSSM. In this GUI, the analyst can compare different
domains by exploring them with help of the features (see
section III-B). A complete kit for own installation can be
retrieved 3 under a GPLv2 license.
V. RELATED WORK
Historically, the pioneering work of Florian Weimer [7] was
the first description of a passive DNS monitoring toolkit that
can be supported by additional data extraction tools. Some of
the proposed extraction tools used linguistic techniques that
use language processing models [13] for detecting malicious
domains. This approach might be useful in the detection of
automatically generated domain names without referring to
human driven naming schemes. In practice, malicious domains
exhibit naming schemes that are indistinguishable from normal
domains. In [13], this work was extended by an additional
module to track IP addresses, which are associated to given
domains. The detection of tunneling over DNS was described
in [14]. One of the first articles to address the relevance of
malicious DNS traffic is [15], where the impact of corrupted
DNS paths in the current Internet are illustrated.
Dealing with large quantities of DNS data has been ad-
dressed in [16] and [17], where tree-like structures are used
to store compressed DNS replies and context-driven clustering
to isolate malicious domains.
A somehow alternative idea is discussed in [18], where
a reputation framework is proposed to cluster name servers,
based on an inferred reputation. The placement of a passive
DNS probe has been subject of research for its own in [19],
[7], [18], [20], [21], [22] and [23], in order to determine
3https://gforge.inria.fr/
docman/view.php/3526/7602/kit dns anomalies.tar.gz
only DNS traffic that has been exchanged between a recursive
server and the respective authoritative domain servers. Target
applications addressed by these works are the detection of
phishing domains. Capturing the original DNS requests issued
by end users is discussed in [17], [24], [15] and [25]. While
timing related information can be integrated into the DNS
monitoring approaches, privacy concerns related to affected
end-users are hindering a large scale deployment.
Machine learning techniques for mining DNS data are
proposed in [26], [20], [21]. The main difference to our work is
that our approach leverages unsupervised clustering techniques
and neither relies on labeled or annotated data sets, nor does
it require external blacklists.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As a core service of the internet, DNS carries a huge
amount of information that is extremely rich to the security
monitoring activity. To exploit this information in an efficient
and automated way, we have presented in this paper a passive
DNS monitoring solution that leverages a relevant Data Mining
algorithm. In this work, we share our observations of DNS
activity and operational results from DNS monitoring by
presenting a novel well designed and implemented prototype,
called DNSSM. DNSSM is an open-source tool that can be
freely downloaded. Though the framework, we have analyzed
two different datasets of passively collected DNS traces by
applying an automated clustering algorithm, where the differ-
ent clusters represent different types of DNS traffic activities.
The efficiency of this analysis has been shown in the paper.
The practical outcomes are multiple. Firstly, DNSSM can be
used to dig in the namespace and expose some clear patterns
of DNS deployment. Features related to the TTL, number
of A records and lifetime of a given domain can assist in
investigating cyber security frauds. Secondly, DNSSM can be
used to debug a DNS deployment. It can provide a local view
on how records from a domain are seen by a community of
users. One important side functionality is its capability to map
content distribution networks. Passive monitoring of large ISP
domain, will infer a large part of current CDN deployment
and sizes. Finally, penetration testing and security assessment
operations can leverage data obtained from DNSSM in order
to map the target network.
Our future work will consist in extending this analysis
approach by using more data sets, where a ground truth of
several botnet infected hosts will be set up. In addition to new
traces, we also plan to enrich the approach with new features
to characterize the traffic so that data can be analyzed more
intuitively. We are also looking forward toward correlating
passive DNS data with Netflow monitoring, albeit the setup
of such an experiment is quite complex and needs to comply
to existing privacy protecting legislation.
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